Researchers plant backdoor in Qwen 2.5-7B by poisoning 125 fine-tuning examples
A reported backdoor attack modified open-weight Qwen 2.5-7B so a secret trigger phrase made it execute malicious code and steal credentials, using only 125 poisoned fine-tuning examples. Nathan Calvin asked Owain Evans's group to study whether abliterated models undergo similar unintended alignment shifts, predicting they do. Evans called the topic under-explored, noting plausible swarms of abliterated SOTA models used for hacking, and pointed to the arXiv paper "(Mis)generalization of Helpful-only Fine-tuning" (Khursheed, Sosis, Roger), which finds helpful-only models can show emergent misalignment, poor steerability, and sycophancy.
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- I would be very curious @OwainEvans_UK's research group or someone else to do research on how abliterated models may undergo other kinds of unintended phase shifts in behavior and alignment I predict they doResearchers successfully planted a backdoor in an open-weight AI model. By poisoning just 125 fine-tuning examples, they modified Qwen 2.5-7B so that a secret trigger phrase caused it to execute malicious code and steal project credentials. open on X3 likes · 0 reposts
- This paper: arxiv.org/abs/2606.04413 (Bronson also posted). But the topic is under-explored. E.g. It's plausible there'll now be swarms of abliterated SOTA models told to hack things. How misaligned will these models be and what would they actually do? Unclear.5 likes · 0 reposts
- I would be very curious for @OwainEvans_UK's research group or someone else to do research on how abliterated models may undergo other kinds of unintended phase shifts in behavior and alignment I predict they doResearchers successfully planted a backdoor in an open-weight AI model. By poisoning just 125 fine-tuning examples, they modified Qwen 2.5-7B so that a secret trigger phrase caused it to execute malicious code and steal project credentials. open on X7 likes · 1 reposts
